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ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the current state of knowledge in the
economics literature on the conduct of reconstruction activities in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As stabilisation and reconstruction missions grow in importance for
units deployed to these regions, it becomes more important to understand what
activities can promote economic growthat the local level.While militaryoperations
focus on interdicting the insurgency, successful counter-insurgency campaigns have
typically addressed the conditions conducive to the insurgency. Mitigating the
incentives for individuals to participate in an insurgency is imperative. Well-crafted
and timed reconstruction activities can, we argue, attenuate these incentives.
Introduction
Given the continued engagement of United States Armed Forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq, an ongoing question is what impact these forces
can have on the reconstruction and economic development of these
countries. Stabilisation and reconstruction operations are imperative to
increase employment, income, public revenues and to attract investment
in deteriorated and destroyed infrastructure. More importantly, from a
security perspective, reconstruction and economic development mitigate
the flow of personnel and resources to the ongoing insurgencies in these
countries. It is important, therefore, to ask not only how reconstruction
assistance promotes economic growth, but also how reconstruction
should proceed in the post-conflict environment.
In this paper, we examine the current state of knowledge in the
economics literature on the conduct of reconstruction activities in Iraq
and Afghanistan. As stabilisation and reconstruction missions grow in
importance for units deployed to these regions, it becomes more
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important to understand what activities can promote economic growth
at the local level. While military operations focus on interdicting the
insurgency, successful counter-insurgency campaigns have typically
addressed the conditions conducive to the insurgency.1 Mitigating the
incentives for individuals to participate in an insurgency is an important
component of stabilisation operations. Well-crafted and timed
reconstruction activities can, we argue, attenuate these incentives.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following
section, we attempt to establish a common definition of stabilisation and
reconstruction operations. In the third section, we examine the timing and
measurement of stabilisation and reconstruction operations. We then
present our theory of the long tail of stabilisation and reconstruction
operations. In the fifth section, we discuss the role of economics in counter-
insurgency operations. The last section concludes and offers policy advice.
What Are Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations?
How should stabilisation and reconstruction operations proceed and
how should we measure progress? US Army doctrine states that stability
operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the
operational environment through a combination of peacetime develop-
mental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.2
Stability operations include peace operations, foreign internal defence,
security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, combating
terrorism, shows of force and counter-insurgency operations. Support
operations prevent or mitigate the effects of natural or man-made
disasters and encompass improving human services, civil adminis-
tration, communications and information, transportation and distri-
bution, energy and commerce. Stabilisation and reconstruction
operations (SARO) are the complementary application of stability and
support operations in support of US national interests in external states.
SAROs are broader in scope than peacekeeping or peace enforcement
operations. The term ‘peacekeeping’ originated in the 1950s to describe
operations limited to the separation of former combatants.3 Peace-
keeping operations grew in scope to include a swath of activities,
ranging from electoral monitoring to monitoring and enforcing
ceasefires. In the early 1990s, ‘peace enforcement’ entered usage to
describe operations in unstable environments with more robust rules of
engagement (ROEs). Sovereign and non-state actors undertook peace-
keeping and peace enforcement operations, often with vague and
conflicting mandates. More recently, with the explicit displeasure voiced
for peacekeeping and ‘nation-building’ operations in the United States,
these activities are now encompassed by terms including ‘stability and
support operations’ and ‘stabilisation and reconstruction operations’.4



































For the purposes of this paper we must clearly delineate between
stability and support operations (SASO), stabilisation and reconstruc-
tion operations (SARO) and peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations (PKO and PEO). PKOs typically occur when there is a
negotiated agreement between former belligerents and focus on
maintaining and fostering stability in a post-conflict environment.5
PEOs, as with PKOs, also occur in the presence of a negotiated
agreement, though force may be applied to separate combatants and
enforce the terms of the agreement.6 Actions may include the application
of force upon one of the combatants to compel them to accept the
provisions of a negotiated agreement, or in the case of Kosovo, to
negotiate an agreement. SASO focuses on providing essential supplies to
designated groups and applying military force to influence the political
and civil environment and may encompass PKOs and PEOs.7
Unlike PKOs, PEOs, and SASOs, SAROs (sometimes referred to as
‘nation building’ or ‘stability operations’) include activities conducted
by military and other governmental institutions to establish and support
a foreign government’s ability to assure the rule of law, internal security,
basic public services and border security.8 Stabilisation and reconstruc-
tion efforts are typically broader in scope, effort, duration and cost.
As opposed to the operations discussed above, SAROs focus on the
development of institutional capacity to foster cooperation and
legitimacy of the emerging government. In Afghanistan, for example,
the Sector Security Reform employed five pillars: Afghan National Army
(US), counter-narcotics (United Kingdom), disarmament, demobilisa-
tion and reintegration (Japan), judiciary (Italy) and law enforcement
(Germany).9 These actions mirror the four pillars of reconstruction:
security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic development;
and governance and participation. 10
The Timing and Measurement of Stabilisation and Reconstruction
Operations
The Timing of Reconstruction
Whether reconstruction should take place during military operations or
only after the cessation of hostilities remains a matter of debate in the
literature. The interdependency of the four pillars of reconstruction
suggests to some that reconstruction should address each area
simultaneously.11 If reconstruction fails to simultaneously address
political and institutional instability, ensure internal security and
address economic and social conditions, then, as this argument goes,
the likelihood of failure is significant.12 Whether these strategies can
be carried out simultaneously in an environment characterised by



































insecurity is of concern. Operationally, tasking military units primarily
concerned with security to instil democratic institutions and rehabilitate
infrastructure may result in a dilution of combat power. Financially,
resource limitations may limit the breadth and depth of reconstruction,
resulting in the appearance of operating institutions rather than the
emergence of capable institutions.
If operational or financial conditions inhibit simultaneous action on
the four pillars of reconstruction, what should come first? Again,
experience and the literature fail to yield a consensus. Some argue that
socio-economic reconstruction must be an integral part of immediate
post-conflict operations.13 Investment at the community level (rather
than large, national-scale reconstruction projects) may improve the
likelihood of success and sustainability by fostering a sense of local
ownership. Smaller, and consequently more numerous, projects at the
local level may present tangible results to communities that would be
otherwise ignored by more traditional resource-intensive reconstruction
projects. Operational units may be ideally placed to deliver these smaller-
scale projects that may also provide positive externalities in terms of
developing local institutions and providing actionable intelligence. Yet
such delegation of responsibility would appear to run counter to the
centralised nature of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While immediate investment may be appealing in the post-conflict
environment, it may not be the most efficient and effective means of
facilitating reconstruction. Post-conflict states typically lack the ability
to absorb reconstruction aid due to a lack of institutional capacity and
endemic corruption. Only after three years, on average, does the
ability to absorb aid increase.14 The large influx of reconstruction aid
in the immediate aftermath of conflict may also negatively impact the
development of local markets. Financial and physical aid can
complement or substitute for local institutions; thus commanders need
to be aware of the need to coordinate their activities with the emergence
of local institutions. Large inflows of international aid, however, can
distort local labour markets in the post-conflict environment, leading
to an outflow of already scarce labour from the public sector to
international governmental (IGO) and non-governmental (NGO)
organisations. The introduction of peacekeepers to the UN Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), for example, led to an increase in the
price of rice, fish, meat and housing and the devaluation of the local
currency by 70 per cent.15 In Afghanistan, a key pillar of public sector
reform is to provide central government departments with the ability to
appoint key personnel at higher than normal pay scales for a fixed term
due to the distortions created by IGOs and NGOs.16 These arguments
suggest that in the aftermath of conflict, social rehabilitation may yield
higher returns than economic reconstruction.



































Given that conflict invariably creates myopia and distrust of public
institutions, reconstruction efforts, in the short-term, should focus on
improving local governance. From this argument, one could conclude
that insecurity, per se, is the symptom and that reconstruction should
focus on the root causes of violence.17 Yet even if military commanders
are predisposed to engage rebuilding social capital and public
institutions (a significant assumption), one must question whether
such nebulous actions are sufficiently incentivised in current practice.
Unlike reconstruction efforts that develop and rehabilitate existing
physical capital, efforts to promote social capital are notoriously hard to
measure.
The Measurement of Stabilisation and Reconstruction
The development of performance metrics that identify the influence of
stabilisation and reconstruction efforts on outcomes would not
necessarily guarantee the adoption of these metrics. As noted in the
literature, organisations may take action to improve their performance in
terms of familiar metrics, even when such actions may have been
detrimental to those outcomes that are of interest to their stakeholders.18
Agents may produce excessive quantities of goods and services whose
characteristics are quantifiable and easily monitored to exploit principals
who lack the knowledge on the true demand for public goods and services
and the costs of producing them. These behaviours favour programmes
for which metrics are readily available over those whose outcomes are
more difficult to quantify. The military and other agencies responsible for
stabilisation and reconstruction have, in fact, used metrics (insurgents
killed/captured/wounded, electricity and oil production, number of
children attending school) that are readily quantifiable.
While military operations to clear insurgent strongholds in Iraq
provide tangible results in terms of individuals detained and arms caches
interdicted, these operations may also undermine the development of a
civil society by increasing animosity towards US forces. Such a strategy
of attrition may be counterproductive in that the killing of insurgents
without destroying their infrastructure or their ability to coerce
resources from the population is a waste of effort.19 Military operations
in the Malay counter-insurgency campaign were limited in scope
and undertaken with specific, narrow objectives and not employed to
intimidate insurgents or their potential supporters.20 The shift in
strategy from search-and-destroy to clear-and-hold operations in
Vietnam under General Creighton Abrams is argued to have improved
security by focusing on the logistical ‘nose’ of these forces and degrading
their ability to sustain combat operations.21 Unlike relatively symmetric
conflict between sovereign (or quasi-sovereign) actors, asymmetric



































conflict may render the use of offensive action ineffective but,
more importantly, counterproductive.22
Even if metrics are focused on outcomes, we argue that capture may
bias performance measurement. Capture occurs when interest groups
seize the benefits of public goods and, in turn, ultimately control
government policies. The likelihood of capture may increase as the scale
of a reconstruction project increases. Capture creates a series of
problems, including overstatement of the cost of provision of local
public goods, corruption and diversion of local public goods to non-
intended groups. Capture may also have the reverse effect; interest
groups may wish to understate the demand for public goods so as to
lower revenue requirements and taxes. The literature is replete with
examples from countries in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and some
Asian countries (the Philippines and Indonesia) where public consump-
tion and transfers have often been misdirected, have not reduced income
inequality, and have largely supported special interests.23 Competition
for control of national-level investment projects, for example, appears to
increase corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency as national elites
attempt to capture the public sector. Competition among national elites
may spur sectarian or ethnic violence, undermining security and
increasing the likelihood of future conflict. Capture may thus misstate
the actual demand for public services in an unknown direction,
rendering performance management techniques unusable.
We argue that the attempt to use performance management
techniques to gauge the success of reconstruction in Afghanistan and
Iraq created (and continues to create) incentives to engage in actions that
may have been detrimental to the objective of improving security. Using
the metric, for example, of individuals detained to proxy for interdicting
the insurgency created the perverse incentive to detain Iraqis, regardless
of actual threat. Using the metric of resources committed to
reconstruction projects, for example, created the incentive to obligate
funds for larger scale projects, regardless of the capacity of the Iraqi
government to sustain these projects over time.24 We can only conclude
that the focus on inputs (obligations, activities started and completed)
instead of outputs (service provision) and, more importantly, outcomes
(security and sustainability) continues to distort decision-making and
inhibits the counter-insurgency campaign.
As counter-insurgency campaigns typically last years, it can be
difficult to identify performance measures that provide information on
annual progress towards achieving results. This effort is complicated by
the presence of multiple parties with disparate goals (the US, Kurds,
Shi’a and Sunni in Iraq, for example). While performance management
techniques may improve the efficiency of government operations
(and a recent GAO report notes that this is an imperfect and incomplete



































process25), gauging progress in wartime is a much more difficult task.
We note that the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
attempts to link inputs, outputs and outcomes in his continued reports
to Congress.26 Whether these recommendations are incorporated in
the day-to-day operations of the Department of Defense (DoD), Multi-
National Forces-Iraq and Combined Forces Command (Afghanistan)
remains to be seen.
The Long Tail of Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations
If reconstruction is to promote security and economic growth, an
unsettled question is the scope and complexity of the reconstruction
process. Should reconstruction focus on the rehabilitation of the national
infrastructure or local infrastructure? Given the inherent weakness of
public institutions in post-conflict countries, the inability to process
investment in the immediate aftermath of conflict and, in many cases, the
prevalence of a culture of corruption, this is an important policy question.
In this section, we develop a new theory on the long tail of stabilisation
and reconstruction operations. We then employ our theory of the long tail
to examine efforts currently under way in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The theory of the long tail argues that as the costs of production and
distribution fall, especially on the Internet, there is less need to lump
products and consumers into ‘one size fits all’ categories.27 Globalisation
promotes the democratisation of production techniques through the
distribution of human capital. Industries that were once the province of
the richest nations are now the foundation of the emerging economies of
China, India and others. Global markets also produce strong incentives
for the minimisation of transactions costs. Retailers that can secure
and transport goods to market more efficiently than others enjoy a
significant advantage. Wal-mart’s success, for example, is widely
attributed to its supply chain management techniques.28 Finally, the
ease of global communications has resulted in the amplification of the
‘word of mouth’ effect. We observe this phenomenon when a heavily
trafficked website links to a little known website (often referred to as the
‘slashdot’ effect after a popular technology website), resulting in a
several-magnitudes increase in traffic to the relatively unknown site for
several days. As technological change lowers the cost of production,
information and acquisition of goods, services and knowledge, we
observe the development of customised products. The depth of songs
available through online music services, for example, dwarfs that
available through traditional retailers.
While the theory of the long tail describes the development and
distribution of niche consumer products, we argue that the underlying
concepts of democratisation, minimisation and amplification can be



































applied to stabilisation and reconstruction operations. Reconstruction
spans a spectrum from highly complex (and relatively high cost per unit)
national-level projects (rehabilitation of an electrical grid, for example)
to relatively simple and lower cost per unit subnational level projects
(the development of a trunk road serving a village). Correspondingly,
while national-level projects result in a significant level of publicity and
performance measurement (electricity and oil production, hospitals and
schools rehabilitated), lower-level projects are less visible and often
provide results that do not lend themselves to quantification. On the
other hand, operational units may be better suited to facilitate smaller
projects that yield positive externalities in terms of building
relationships that yield actionable intelligence. Smaller projects may
also reduce the transaction costs associated with reconstruction
operations, a counterintuitive argument that we discuss below.
Given these concerns, we argue that the principles of democratisation,
minimisation and amplification can be applied to current reconstruction
efforts. As illustrated in Figure 1, our theory of the long tail of
stabilisation and reconstruction operations suggests a relationship exists
between the complexity of a project and the government level at which
the project should be implemented. Democratising reconstruction would
entail smaller (and thus more numerous) reconstruction projects that
Figure 1. The Long Tail of Reconstruction



































employ local businesses. Infrastructure rehabilitation would entail the
hiring and oversight of a greater number of local contractors to avoid the
potential of rent-seeking when only a small number of large contracts are
let. Operational units could thus contract with local firms to provide
reconstruction services, increasing employment of the local populace and
attenuating the economic incentives for insurgent employment. This
would, of course, entail a significant shift in current doctrine that has
tended to centralise and micro-manage reconstruction efforts since 2003.
An example of this approach bearing fruit is the construction of a
landfill in the Al-Rasheed district in Baghdad in 2004.29 Rather than
employing a capital-intensive approach, approximately 4,000 local
labourers were hired at rates ranging from $5 to $7 per day, using hand-
held tools. Given estimates of one worker supporting a familial network
of ten to 15 people, this suggests that approximately 40,000 to 60,000
people were directly supported by this effort. While the wage rate of these
workers was lower than that offered at the time by the insurgency
(estimated at approximately $300 per month), the risk-adjusted wage
rate for the construction work was likely higher than that of the
insurgency as attacks apparently declined during the construction period.
While it would appear that letting a large number of smaller contracts
would exacerbate transaction costs, we argue that the anecdotal evidence
from current efforts suggests that we could do no worse. Large contracts
have multiple layers of subcontractors with multiple levels of mark-ups.
Audits of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the US (after Hurricane
Katrina) illustrate mark-ups approaching 1700 per cent of the actual cost
of service provision.30 Larger contracts are likely to be the subject of
intense competition for the capture of rents, suggesting that malfeasance
may become an issue. Whether or not national-level reconstruction
projects are sustainable, given the weak revenue capacity of the public
sector in post-conflict countries, is also of concern. Smaller (and more
local projects) are more likely to have stronger connections with the local
populace, increasing the likelihood that they will pay for the provision
of these services. We suggest that, at a minimum, a more decentralised
approach to reconstruction will result in the same, if not lower
transactions costs.
Finally, our theory suggests that a larger number of smaller
reconstruction projects may amplify the impact of reconstruction. If the
goal of reconstruction is to ‘win hearts and minds’, then increasing the
breadth of reconstruction may facilitate efforts to achieve this goal. In
the Philippines from 1899 to 1902, for example, the US Army employed
over 500 small garrisons to live with local communities, enforce law and
order and fight the insurgency.31 In South Vietnam, unified civil-military
teams were deployed in each of the 250 districts and 44 provinces.32 In
Afghanistan, it is widely acknowledged that reconstruction assistance is



































primarily concentrated around Kabul.33 Historical experience would
suggest an expansion of the relatively small existing Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) programme.34 Operationally, decentralised
reconstruction projects may allow unit-level commanders to reap positive
externalities in terms of awareness and intelligence. The above arguments,
of course, open a debate on whether stabilisation and reconstruction
efforts should occur in a centralised or decentralised manner.
Applying the Theory of the Long Tail to Reconstruction
A potential counter-insurgency strategy is to convince the population
that the government is both capable and is winning against the
insurgents. One method to accomplish this task is to provide the
population with services to improve the standard of living; there are,
however, two potential approaches to accomplish this task. Centralised
coordination and provision may be necessary to address problems of
weak institutional capacity at the sub-national level. On the other hand,
decentralised provision may better suit the preferences and needs of
heterogeneous sub-national jurisdictions. As noted above, decentralised
provision may address the long tail of reconstruction, yielding positive
externalities in terms of improved security and sustainability. Yet there is
a distinct lack of discussion in the decentralisation literature as to its
application to post-conflict environments.
To discuss whether decentralisation should be applied to reconstruc-
tion operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we must first explicitly define
the difference between the deconcentration, delegation and decentra-
lisation of public expenditures. What some governments call fiscal
decentralisation is actually nothing more than the geographical
deconcentration of central government bureaucracy and service delivery.
Deconcentration can be described as a process geared to increasing the
effectiveness and flexibility of the provision of government services by
providing previously centralised services through regional and local
offices but, other than geographic similarities, deconcentration has little
to do with fiscal decentralisation. Although there are several ways to
describe the process of fiscal decentralisation, its essence is captured by
the two related processes of either delegation or devolution of fiscal
authority. In either case, decision-making power on the composition of
expenditures and often on the composition and level of revenues is
shifted to separately elected sub-national governments.35
When done well, decentralised governments can be more efficient,
more sensitive to local needs, provide services to a larger number of
people, and increase political representation. At the macroeconomic
level, decentralisation may promote allocative efficiency, macroeco-
nomic stability and economic development.36 Decentralisation may be



































particularly important in post-conflict countries in that it may
strengthen democratic governance at the sub-national level and provides
a political mechanism for curbing the powers of the central
government.37 Appropriately structured decentralisation not only
improves governance by improving incentives but also may enhance
and preserve markets, crucial for post-conflict development.38
Decentralisation, especially when conducted through unit-level com-
manders and organisations, suggests that reconstruction may be
relatively more responsive and nimble to local conditions than
centralised provision. This would encourage innovation in reconstruc-
tion policies, reinforcing successful policies and discouraging policies
that fail.39 Moreover, decentralisation can increase political stability
and national unity by allowing citizens to better control public
programmes at the local level.40 For countries that are ethnically and
geographically diverse, decentralised reconstruction may improve
security by damping ethnic and regional tensions.
When done poorly, decentralisation can exacerbate macroeconomic
instability and degrade service provision. Decentralisation can increase
horizontal disparities, especially if revenues are apportioned on a
derivation basis.41 In the case of Iraq, for example, the question of
whether oil revenues should accrue to the central or sub-national
governments is a cause of political and sectarian tension. If oil revenues
accrue to the Kurdish and Shi’a autonomous regions, the central,
predominately Sunni, region of Iraq may lack sufficient revenue capacity
to provide public goods and services. Decentralisation may also limit the
ability of the central government to capture externalities associated with
the provision of national public goods. Sub-national governments may
engage in policies counter to those of the central government, wreaking
havoc with economic and monetary policies. Furthermore, the case for
decentralisation rests upon a series of assumptions that may be
exceedingly stringent for developing countries, let alone countries
emerging (or grappling with) armed conflict.42 Democratic governance,
a necessary condition for the gains of decentralisation to be fully
realised, may require a minimum level of literacy, basic institutional
capabilities and a measure of gender equality.43 The potential virtues of
fiscal decentralisation may also be, in part, dependent upon political
accountability. But even political accountability alone may be
insufficient for benefits of decentralisation to occur. Local officials
must also have the authority to determine and implement revenue and
expenditure policies.44 Given the absence of democratic institutions, the
culture of corruption and the lack of sub-national capacity, one might
conclude that centralised reconstruction is more appropriate.
Yet we must recognise that the choice in Iraq and Afghanistan is not
whether fiscal decentralisation should take place; it is a fact on the



































ground. In Afghanistan, the central government’s authority is centred
on Kabul and is weak due to the legacy of the Soviet invasion and years
of succeeding civil war. In Iraq, the lack of an effective post-conflict plan
and actions by the occupying authority essentially decentralised the
country, regardless of actual intent. Some degree of centralisation of
public authority must occur, as most scholars would argue that weak
central governments (without correspondingly strong sub-national
governments) invariably produce weak states.
Given the decentralised nature of post-conflict states, the question
that remains is whether reconstruction should be decentralised or
centralised in nature. Centralised reconstruction could increase the
legitimacy of the nascent central government. Decentralised provision,
on the other hand, may result in stronger local governments and a closer
match with the preferences of local populations. We argue that, given
the security objectives of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,
reconstruction should be decentralised and extend beyond a ‘Bagh-
dad-first’ or ‘Kabul-first’ strategy. Although sub-national governments
are quite weak, decentralised reconstruction can assist them in building
capacity. Soliciting citizen inputs on when and what projects should
occur is likely to promote the development of a civil society. Large-scale
national-level reconstruction projects fail to address this long tail and
may actually foster a culture of dependence.
We must recognise that in many post-conflict states there is not an
economic ‘centre of gravity’ that, if invigorated, would induce economic
growth in the remainder of the state. Post-conflict states, by their very
nature, are fractured entities, lacking sufficient institutions or
infrastructure for national-level projects. If we accept the argument
that building institutional capacity increases in complexity, risk and
effort as the level of government increases, then it may be more prudent
to build the capacity of local institutions first. These are the levels of
government that are in close contact with military units, thereby
fostering relationships that assist in the Counter-insurgency Operations
(COIN) fight.
One method of implementing decentralisation reconstruction is
community-driven reconstruction (CDR). CDR has two main objec-
tives: fast and cost-effective reconstruction assistance with an emphasis
on local choice and accountability.45 CDR can assist unit-level
commanders in security and reconstruction activities by building
linkages between nascent local governments and commanders through
the conduit of reconstruction assistance. First, commanders support the
democratic selection of local councils, thus enhancing the stature and
long-term viability of these councils. Second, commanders can provide
local councils with block grants that are tied to measurable outcomes.
The provision of block grants allows the councils and other institutions



































of local governments to develop capacity under the auspices of the local
commander, without the local commander being the primary point
of contact for the conduct of the work. Third, commanders should
emphasise that use of grant funds will be audited and that further
assistance is dependent upon appropriate, transparent and equitable use
of funds. The mechanism for this approach exists and has been vetted by
experience; the question is whether decision-makers can ‘loosen the
reins’ to reap the potential benefits of decentralised reconstruction.
Conclusions
Most unit-level commanders do not operate in the capital or regional
capitals. The 3rd and 4th Brigade Combat Teams of the 10th Mountain
Division, each comprised of approximately 3,000 soldiers, were
responsible for 14 of the 21 provinces of Afghanistan in 2006.46
In some instances, a company-level commander and senior non-
commissioned officer (NCO) were the senior representatives of the
United States in a province (Afghanistan) or town (Iraq). While there are
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) engaged in reconstruction
activities in Afghanistan, these are relatively small in number (50–100
soldiers and civilians in regional capitals) compared to the operational
units. Technical assistance remains concentrated in the capital, and
regional and local governments have yet to receive substantial attention
from NGOs and IGOs, especially in the case of Afghanistan.
Further complicating the role of the operational commander is the
lack of integration between military operations and the financial
resources to facilitate reconstruction and economic development in their
area of responsibility. Initially, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), commanders had significant
flexibility and resources in the form of commanders’ emergency
response funds (CERF). Over time, however, CERF resources have
dwindled and become bureaucratised and micromanaged.
Operationally, these arguments suggest that commanders are
invariably torn between disparate missions. Commanders must provide
security but are also tasked with training local security organisations and
promoting local governance and economic reconstruction. Invariably,
these roles come into conflict and may also create a culture of dependency.
Commanders, responding to incentives, may focus on readily quantifi-
able actions, even though such actions may degrade long-term stability.
To assist these commanders, we argue that reconstruction assistance
should be decentralised to, at a minimum, the battalion level. If possible,
platoon and company-level commanders should have some discretion in
the employment of reconstruction assistance. We note that this would
entail a substantial modification of the existing reconstruction system



































but question why centralisation is necessary, especially when those
making decisions are removed from the battlefield. The operational-unit
commander, by interacting with local governments, can solicit
preferences and audit results. While this is a shift away from traditional
military operations, post-conflict operations are not traditional military
operations. If we can take advantage of the long tail of reconstruction
operations, we can generate positive externalities that bolster combat
power and counter-insurgency operations.
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